The most interesting accounts deal with his service with Rommel in the desert, but it may well be that the most enlightening portions deal with his analysis of the latter days on the eastern front and the western front. The lessons that this veteran of armored combat teaches in this book are almost so obvious as to question the value of citing them here. However, since these insights were ignored to the peril of Allied and sometimes, Axis forces, I cite them here. First of all, over and over again, he cites his enemies tendency to throw armored units piecemeal against the concentrated forces of German armor.
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The most interesting accounts deal with his service with Rommel in the desert, but it may well be that the most enlightening portions deal with his analysis of the latter days on the eastern front and the western front.
The lessons that this veteran of armored combat teaches in this book are almost so obvious as to question the value of citing them here. However, since these insights were ignored to the peril of Allied and sometimes, Axis forces, I cite them here. First of all, over and over again, he cites his enemies tendency to throw armored units piecemeal against the concentrated forces of German armor.
Before one is even 50 pages into the book, we read that de Gaulle did so with the 4th Armored Divison after the Sedan. On page , we read concerning the Gazala battles that "The British armor had suffered heavily--once again their command failed to coordinate the tank brigades. They sent their various corps into battle without co-ordinating the timing of their attacks, and without the co-operation of the numerous infantry divisions. Consider: At Stalingrad, the German troops needed hundred tons of supplies per day.
Third, von Mellenthin emphasizes the need to be able to place concentrated force at a particular point schwerpunkt or spearhead by using armored mobility to reach the vulnerable points before the enemy expects it. Fourth, he writes about the value of positioning guns such that they can triangulate on the same target, rather than spreading them out in a line as per Field Marshal Model during the defense of Poland pp.
Further, because Hitler was both obsessed and secretive, no one could offer truly sound counsel. This is a warning to all people in leadership. January 1, David Hill Perhaps more like 2. Parts of the book are interesting, but far too much of it is simply a recitation of troop dispositions. There are numerous maps that assist in following the text, but I still felt at times it would be better to place tokens on a map. Very dry stuff. I felt the book improved when he went to Russia, or when he used extended quotes from some of his colleagues.
There ar Perhaps more like 2. There are many battalions, divisions, and armies, but no soldiers. At one point he says the Russian advances into eastern Germany rival only ancient Rome for violence and human deprivation.
In his final analysis he makes sure to point out that he restricted his work to the purely military, as if to say it is independent of the state for which it does its business.
He feels he should hold his head up proudly to have done an honorable job as a German officer. He feels nothing would have been served had Hitler died in the July 20 attempt. He also asks the question whether the Germans could have won the war. Perhaps if Mellenthin and his colleagues had had a little less honor, a little less patriotism, things might have turned out differently. This is the memoir of one of the men in just the right place in history to see every European front and work just below high command and just above the men in the field.
He understood the high-level strategic command. He understood the field tactics. He took orders from and consulted with some of the most famous German commanders. All the successes were due to the men in the field. And the Russians were lucky, over-supplied by Americans, or anything but tactically or strategically better. I found this book fascinating, and if I were an Armor-branch officer, and therefore likely to serve in the same types of roles as the author, I would make a point of trying to read it every other year or so.
Mellenthin was there and tells it how it was in the desert much as Speer does in "Inside the Third Reich". January 1, Panzer Battles is a great account of tank warfare during WW2. January 1, Monty Milne This is a very mixed bag. But it is ultimately as self serving as the memoirs of Badoglio and Weygand, which I have also read though Mellenthin is far more interestingly written. About the Final Solution he claimed to be entirely ignorant until after the war. Yeah right….
Despite this, the panzer battles themselves are engrossingly described, especially in the western desert. And the portraits of those generals he worked with are fascinating — from the flawed but charismatic Rommel to the flawed and unpleasant Model. January 1, Iain von Mellenthin is at his best when describing in detail those actions in which he directly participated. In practice this amount to his chapters on the North African campaign and his time in Russia. This portion of the book is "bracketed" by coverage of campaigns that von Mellenthin reports on rather poorly.
In the fashion of "this unit moved here and that unit moved there. January 1, Jeff Very good book written by a German officer after the war, with tactical insights that he felt would be of assistance to the NATO forces in any conflict with the Soviet Union.
These tactics were hard won from fighting on the Eastern front. But also as transposed to fighting the Western USA, UK forces, and how those Western forces tactics would,in his opinion, fare against those of the Comblock. It is very interesting to "look over the shoulder",as it were, of the German commanders in some of th Very good book written by a German officer after the war, with tactical insights that he felt would be of assistance to the NATO forces in any conflict with the Soviet Union.
It is very interesting to "look over the shoulder",as it were, of the German commanders in some of the pivotal battles of WW2. Definitely needs to be read and on the shelf of any aspiring military historians. January 1, Arlomisty Very good book on a tactical strategy point of view. Written by a German officer who participated in all the various campaigns throughout the book January 1, Andrew Garrie Offers an excellent insight into warfare on the eastern front.
Good analysis of manoeuvre warfare, although the author is a little one sided in his views and glosses over mistakes made by German commanders. January 1, Nick Wyckoff I picked up this book while doing research for the second book in my series The Kalisun Initiative.
I was looking for a solid reference guide on the tactics and challenges of one might face in an armored conflict that covers vast distances.
Most modern tank battles have been decidedly one-sided so I went looking farther back to World War II, with a particular interest for armored war in the vast spaces of north Africa and the Russian steppe. This book did not disappoint, in fact it was all that I I picked up this book while doing research for the second book in my series The Kalisun Initiative.
This book did not disappoint, in fact it was all that I could hope for in a paperback. The book was broken into sections that track to specific battles and includes illustrations and extensive footnotes. He had direct contact with some of the preeminent military minds of the German army at the time and went into considerable detail about what was done "right", what was done "wrong" and how the unexpected surprises in war can shift the progression of a battle.
I found the discussion on armored tactics to be skillfully woven into the overall conversation the author was having. Overall I found the book quite useful and I took extensive notes while reading it. I can see why the U. War college utilized his knowledge to train our tank commanders during the cold war. His experience in Russia in particular was extensive. Additionally, there is no e-book version of it and finding a copy of the paperback in good shape was not easy.
To some readers his self-evident pride in the effectiveness of his comrades actions may be a bitter pill given that effectiveness frequently resulted in allied casualties of significant number. If you are interested in history this is a good book for you, especially if you have read other books on the topics before Infantry Attacks is an excellent resource as well. If you are interested in learning more about the tactics and techniques that were employed with great success this is a great book.
He is a terrific narrator and an excellent teacher. His discourses on combined arms and the methods of German success using it under various conditions are of good use to any student of modern warfare, and the evolution of our own military doctrines can be easily seen to originate in the lessons learned by the Germans.
The maps included with the text were helpful in their frequency, but not in their execution. They were absolutely lacking in necessary detail and often made little contribution to the text, particularly when they were depicting more tactical-level events.
If ever you find yourself in a Panzer or any tank this is the book you need with you! Joking aside its a fantastic 1st hand account of battle field tactics on all fronts during the 2nd world war excluding Italy. How each campaign was fought and the tactics used. Also how each campaign was lost due to the Allies eventually emulating and improving on the German model of tank warfare along with the eventual exhausting of supply lines and material towards the end of the war.
What s A fantastic read. What sets this apart it is a soldiers view of the war. It is unapologetic and has not included any political background in line with the old German General Staff. I found the last chapter very insightful into the mindset of the soldier during the war and the realization during his internment after the war as to the reality.
He participated in most of the major campaigns of the war, and looks beyond the political influences to strengths and weaknesses in tactics and logistics. This was a fascinating look inside the decision making and execution process of the German army, and is a good foundation for further study. Von Mellenthin is an engaging writer who very clearly tells the story from someone who lived on the front lines and fully understood the operational end of the war.
It also illustrates how, even in this war, the average soldier was far removed from the politics of the day and just doing his duty. Was also very interesting to read about how Adolf Hitler, in the end, really defeated himself.
Reminds me of another would-be dictator I know. Let us ne This was an excellent book on World War 2 strategy. Let us never forget the past Excellent tactical observations. Very much in favor of old-style German officer corps, but has telling opinions on the tactics of all sides. Well worth reading for a wargamer interested in small unit engagements, as well as some overall strategy.
Afrika Korps the best part. January 1, Martin I loved reading this book! It is hard to put down! One has to recall that it was written in the 50s, after Korea and way before the "Ultra" revelation, so it spends a lot of time discussing Soviet intentions in Europe. And the man clearly is trying to distance himself from atrocities. But if you want to have a better understanding of warfare in the desert and Eastern Front in WW2, thus is a great place to start.
Panzer Battles by Von Mellenthin Maj Gen F W
In , Friedrich von Mellenthin enlisted in the Reichsheer ; in he married Ingeborg von Aulock. He was assigned to the Prussian Military Academy in Between and June , Mellenthin held several general staff positions in the Army ; in June , Mellenthin was posted to North Africa, where he served as a staff officer in the Afrika Corps until September On 28 December, Mellenthin was given command of 9th Panzer Division , which was then engaged in the Battle of the Bulge. From March to May he was chief of staff of the 5th Panzer Army. Mellenthin surrendered to the British Army on 3 May and spent two and a half years in an internment camp.
Friedrich von Mellenthin
Shelves: history-wwii Perhaps more like 2. Parts of the book are interesting, but far too much of it is simply a recitation of troop dispositions. There are numerous maps that assist in following the text, but I still felt at times it would be better to place tokens on a map. Very dry stuff. I felt the book improved when he went to Russia, or when he used extended quotes from some of his colleagues. There Perhaps more like 2. There are many battalions, divisions, and armies, but no soldiers.